Promotion of New Commander and Commissar Points to Purge of High-Level Officers
The promotion of both Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng occurs as several high-level PLARF officers have not been seen in months.
On July 31st, the Central Military Commission (CMC) promoted Wang Houbin 王厚斌 and Xu Xisheng 徐西盛 to the rank of General during a ceremony at the Bayi Building in Beijing. The CMC also promoted Wang to become the new People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) Commanding General (CG) and Xu as the PLARF Deputy Commanding General (DCG) and Political Commissar (PC).
On July 31st, the Central Military Commission (CMC) promoted Wang Houbin 王厚斌 and Xu Xisheng 徐西盛 to the rank of General during a ceremony at the Bayi Building in Beijing. The CMC also promoted Wang to become the new People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) Commanding General (CG) and Xu as the PLARF Deputy Commanding General (DCG) and Political Commissar (PC). The promotion ceremony comes as several high-level PLARF officers – including the previous PLARF CG Li Yuchao 李玉超, the PLARF DCG and PC Liu Guangbin刘光斌 – disappeared from public view for several months. The disappearance and the promotion and appointment of Wang and Xu indicates that Xi is purging the branch likely due to several reasons.
The promotion of both Wang and Xu to head the PLARF come as several other high-level officers disappeared in recent months. The officers left the public eye as claims that the CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection opened investigations into several officers since at least late 2022.
High-Level PLARF or PLARF Linked Officer Disappearances
The promotion of both Wang and Xu to head the PLARF come as several other high-level officers disappeared in recent months. The officers left the public eye as claims that the CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection opened investigations into several officers since at least late 2022. These officers range from Xu’s predecessors, Xu Zhongbo 徐忠波, and Zhang Zhenzhong 张振中, to Wei Fenghe 魏凤和, the first PLARF CG and former Defense Minister. The disappearances also extended to officers who were once associated with the PLARF or its predecessor, the Second Artillery Corps. Lt. General Shang Hong 尚宏, DCG and the commander of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force’s Space Systems Department 航天系统部 also disappeared in October 2022. Shang’s status as a National People’s Congress representative was revoked at the same time.
However, the circumstances surrounding former PLARF PC Lt. General Wu Guohua 吴国华 death in early July 2023, adds more significance to the ongoing disappearances. Wu reportedly died at his more on July 4, 2023, from a cerebral hemorrhage at the age of 66. However, rumors began to circulate around the Chinese Internet and social media that Wu committed suicide by hanging because of the investigation into Yi. Wu’s funeral was low-key – which is uncharacteristic for active or retired PLA generals – and his obituary did not mention he was a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Wang’s and Xu’s Careers Before the PLARF
The promotion of both Wang and Xu as the CG and the DCG and PC of the PLARF is significant since both never served in the PLARF in any capacity before July 31st. Before being promoted to both general and the PLARF’s CG, Wang was an officer and possibly PC in the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Wang held numerous military and party positions throughout his career, being stationed primarily at units located in either the East and South Sea Fleets and a member of the Standing Committee of the PLAN’s CCP Committee. However, Wang ‘s highest position held during his PLAN career was the DCG of the PLAN. Xu is also an outsider to the PLARF since he spent most of his career as a PC in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). He held several commissar positions in both the Central and Southern Theater Commands, including the director of the Central Theater Command’s PLAAF Political Work Department. Xu was also the director of the PLAAF’s Political Department of the now defunct Beijing Military Region. However, his highest position was the PC of the Southern Theater Command.
Analysis: The disappearances of high-level PLARF officers and commissars indicates that Xi is ‘clearing house’ of individuals who can potentially cause problems with his control over the organization rather than corruption. These problems range from individuals developing their own powerbases to disagreeing with Xi’s aggressive policies towards Taiwan. Several of the purged officers – such as Zhang and Shang – were previously stationed at Jiuquan and the Xichang Satellite Launch Centers. Furthermore, several of the officers were also stationed at several bases with former PLARF CG and Defense Minister Wei. Wei or the commissars may have developed enough connections 关系 to create their own alternative powerbases within the PLARF that could have more influence than Xi even after they retired.
Xi may have also ordered the purge to remove from the PLARF any ‘military princelings’ – the children or grandchildren of PLA generals or PCs – that historically made up the branch. He purged several princelings after he came into power in 2013 because they represent ‘illnesses’ – such as rampant corruption, and cronyism – that could potentially cause the downfall of the CCP. These princelings also created their own powerbases in the PLARF where gained power and influence through connections developed using various forms of bribery.
Another reason for the purge is that the PLARF officers did not approve of Xi’s aggressive policies against Taiwan and did not blindly agree to his plans. The PLARF is the most educated of all the PLA branches and are very intelligent, experts in various technologies, and well read on foreign affairs topics. They would understand what could happen if ordered to use the various missile systems the PLARF has. Xi interpreted this as the officers and the PLARF as not wanting to carry out his orders and not wanting to fight a war since they know the result would be if they conducted a strike against any U.S. military facility or vessel.
Xi promoted Wang and Xu to head the PLARF to nullify the powerbases’ influence, reign in the princelings power, and to ensure the branch will follow his directives and orders. Both Wang and Xu have Xi’s trust since he likely knew them from when he was a senior CCP official in Fujian province are either a part of his powerbase or associated closely with it. They also are not connected to any PLARF powerbases or princelings – because they spent most of their careers in the PLAN and PLAAF – so are well situated to quash their influence and power. Finally, both Wang and Xu will allow the PLARF to fight wars since the branches they’re originally from – the PLAN (Wang) and the PLAAF (Xu) – modernized with a specific emphasis on that aspect. Both will also follow all Xi’s directives since they are either part of his powerbase or are sycophants who will obey orders to continue to be in his good favor.